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The paper examines and evaluates the relations between 
the first and the second tier of local government in Cro-
atia and their evolution during the past two decades. The 
beginning of the period was rather promising for local 
government development as Croatia began its path to EU 
membership and constitutionally re-defined its local gov-
ernment institutions, embracing a modern concept based 
on subsidiarity and decentralization. The absence of ter-
ritorial consolidation reforms and limited decentralization 
efforts that followed have produced a specific interplay be-
tween the roles of municipalities and counties that deviates 
from the current comparative (European) trends which 
suggest the rise of basic municipal tier and diminish the 
importance of intermediate territorial levels. The context 
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of Europeanization and the concept of multi-level govern-
ance shape the framework for the analysis. The interde-
pendence between the tiers has been increasing but has 
only sporadically produced cooperative and complementa-
ry relations and outcomes. In many areas, counties have re-
tained coordinating, supplementing, and supervisory roles 
towards municipalities. Competitive and even conflicting 
relations that emerge from this setting could harm the ca-
pacity of the local government system to be responsive and 
efficient in dealing with modern-day challenges. 
Keywords: cooperation, Europeanization, inter-governmen-
tal relations, Croatia, multi-level governance, second tier 
of local government
1. Introduction1
Contemporary intergovernmental relations are influenced and shaped by 
two different ideas, each of them particularly highlighted in the context of 
Europeanization of public governance. Firstly, it has been advocated that 
a clear separation of responsibilities between territorial levels should se-
cure full and exclusive competences to each of them, following the provi-
sions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (ECLSG). This 
ought to reduce overlapping and contribute to the integration and better 
coordination of local policies. Furthermore, these requirements seek to 
prevent dispersion of political responsibility and accountability, and to 
ensure that the autonomy of lower government tiers is not constrained by 
upper levels’ discretionary decisions in shared policy areas. On the other 
hand, and quite contrary to the former, more and more public policies 
require intensive inter-governmental interaction, harmonized and com-
plementary actions and cooperative implementation; a setting that has 
usually been labelled as multi-level governance (MLG). Orientation of 
local governments towards problem-solving, complex trans-jurisdictional 
1 To a lesser extent, this paper is based on the paper Relations between local and county 
government in Croatia: Cooperation and competition in Europeanization context which was pre-
sented at the NISPAcee 27th Annual Conference in Prague (2019) and published in From 
Policy Design to Policy Practice: e-Proceedings of the 27th NISPAcee Annual Conference (NI-
SPAcee).
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issues, and improvement of local and regional competitiveness do not tol-
erate unilateral strategies and isolation. Therefore, rigorous separation of 
roles, powers, and resources cannot be recommended in policy areas with 
elevated levels of functional interdependence. Many European countries 
have responded to these challenges by improving structural integration of 
their local government systems, predominantly through the adoption of 
several possible reform strategies: a) consolidation of basic local govern-
ment (municipal) tier; b) regionalization; c) creation and stimulation of 
more integrated forms of inter-municipal cooperation. Implementation of 
these reforms has transformed the roles of self-governmental levels as well 
as the patterns of their relations, initiating “a process in which interme-
diate (second-tier) local authorities are liable to be the prime casualties” 
(CLRA, 2013, p. 2).
Despite facing similar challenges prior and after the accession to the Eu-
ropean Union in 2013, and unlike many other countries, Croatia has not 
implemented a serious structural reform of its local government system, 
whose main structural features have been intact since 1993. The context of 
central government dominance and quasi-hierarchical inter-governmental 
relations created competitive interdependence between local government 
tiers. Municipalities and counties have historically shared similar fates, 
but still often competed with each other; not only for resources, but also 
for competences and legitimacy. This was particularly emphasized during 
the austerity period (2009-2014) in which local government expenditure 
was reduced and comprehensive territorial reforms were considered (Ko-
prić, Škarica & Manojlović Toman, 2018). Facing the possibility of deeper 
changes, each level adopted unilateral strategies to increase its visibility 
and legitimacy and to prove the necessity of its existence (Đulabić, 2015, 
p. 150). The ambiguity between cooperative and competitive strategies, 
divergent goals, and non-coherent interplay of their policies have often 
been a zero-sum game, which resulted in dispersion of responsibility, au-
thority, and resources.
The purpose of this paper is to examine, analyse and evaluate the relations 
between first and second tiers of local government in Croatia and their 
evolution in the past two decades – a period which started with a great 
promise of decentralization and was characterized by gradual Europeani-
zation of public institutions on one hand and by complete absence of local 
government structural reforms on the other. The paper contributes to an 
ongoing debate about the appropriate tuning of local government institu-
tions in contemporary context of complex problems and interdependent 
solutions. In order to assess the nature and quality of these relations, it 
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will focus on several of their aspects: mutual relevance, interdependence, 
influence and interference of their roles and competences. Municipalities 
and counties are taken as integrated politico-administrative entities, and 
although the distinction between political and managerial (administra-
tive) relations is recognized, they are not analysed separately. Several in-
ter-related research questions make up the research framework: 
1.  Where do these relations fall on a continuum between the extremes 
of functionally separated and fully autonomous tiers and chaotic rela-
tions in which individual roles of tiers are indistinguishable and where 
everyone is doing (or trying to do) everything? 
2.  How did the absence of comprehensive consolidation reforms in 
Croatia affect individual positions of local government tiers within 
the national system of territorial governance and how did it contrib-
ute to the nature of their relations? Did any particular tier benefit 
more and strengthen its position during this period? 
3.  Did the position and the importance of the intermediate tier (counties) 
in relation to municipalities diminish or increase and to what extent? 
4.  Did the changes, which were influenced by contemporary context 
(EU influence being vital), help municipal level to emancipate from 
the tutelage of upper territorial levels? 
The emphasis of the paper is on formal relations and formal rules and 
institutions they are based on or they produce. The research is both lon-
gitudinal and cross-sectoral; the former seeks to analyse the evolution of 
these relations and their consequences, and the latter tries to capture and 
explain their variation across different functional areas. The idea is to gain 
a general understanding of the interplay between the roles and strategies 
of the tiers and positions in which they are embedded and not to empir-
ically examine their day-to-day interaction and relational practices and 
their variation among individual counties and municipalities. 
In order to answer research questions and to grasp the multi-faceted na-
ture of municipal-county relations, a combination of different method-
ologies of data collection and analysis has been used. Formal aspects of 
municipal-county relations, which include their roles, functions and com-
petences as well as the platforms for their cooperative relations, are pre-
sented through an analysis of the relevant legal framework and its changes 
over time (4.1., 4.3.). This information should indicate the level of mutual 
relevance, influence, and functional interdependence between the tiers. 
Official financial indicators found in local government budgetary reports 
are employed to indicate the level of resource (inter)dependence between 
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the tiers and to identify the tier that benefited most during the observed 
period (4.2.). The author’s own research results and empirical findings 
of other authors (4.4.) provide a valuable insight in actors’ perception 
and evaluation of these relations and their specific aspects. Data from 
secondary sources (reports, registries) that indicate quantity and quality 
of certain relations between municipalities and counties are used through-
out the text.
2. Vertical Relations within Sub-National 
Government Systems in European Context
The existence and the role(s) of higher tier(s) of sub-national government 
are primarily contingent on the structure and functional scope of the basic 
municipal level. According to Ivanišević (2009, pp. 671-672), there are 
three main reasons for the establishment of upper levels of local govern-
ment: a) provision of public services that exceed the capacity of municipal 
level; b) articulation and aggregation of political interests of wider areas 
and c) vertical and horizontal integration of the whole system of territorial 
governance within a country, i.e. provision of the appropriate coordina-
tion, monitoring, control and distribution of resources. Therefore, reasons 
behind the establishment of higher territorial levels will govern the nature, 
the quality, and the frequency of vertical relations within local government 
systems. According to Bobbio (2002), we can distinguish four models of 
such relationships: 1. Dependence – municipal authorities depend on the 
upper tiers and have lower levels of autonomy, narrowly defined compe-
tences and scarce resources; 2. Separation – model is based on non-in-
terference, mutual independence and strict separation of competences; 
interaction among local government tiers is reduced to minimum; 3. Co-
operation – competences among the levels are shared; policy-making and 
problem-solving are usually collective and concerted efforts; 4. Competi-
tion – tiers of sub-national government compete for resources which can 
result in their more efficient allocation, but also in dispersion. Natural-
ly, the quality of these relations varies across countries and reflects their 
specific institutional architectures, but it varies even more across policy 
sectors in individual countries. Intergovernmental institutional settings 
across European countries are both diverse and dynamic. These dynamics 
are manifested through a mixture of structural and functional reforms that 
have been implemented in European countries in the past several dec-
ades. Individually or combined, these overhauls sought modernization, ra-
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tionalization, and efficiency of service delivery; concentration of resources 
for tackling complex and cross-sectoral problems; improvement of demo-
cratic standards and the increase of sub-national autonomy, etc. (Swianie-
wicz & Gendzwill, 2017; Baldersheim, 2010; Goldsmith & Page, 2010; 
Škarica, 2013; 2015; Hulst & van Montfort, 2012; Koprić, 2018). These 
reforms altered the nature of intergovernmental relations and patterns of 
their interaction. Unilateral dependence of lower tiers on the upper ones 
has been transformed into mutual interdependence. Strict separation of 
functions between territorial tiers does not seem possible any longer, as 
the number of policy issues that require their joint and coherent action 
has multiplied. Joint actions cannot be based on spontaneous and sporad-
ic cooperative interaction but need to be frequent and stable. To achieve 
this, there has been a multitude of cooperative platforms and institutions 
initiated, supported, and stimulated by central policies. At the same time, 
interaction that is more frequent increases chances for conflict. Finally, 
the environment of fiscal stress and the need for legitimacy and greater 
visibility have transformed local government units into proactive players 
that seek additional resources in both the public and the private sphere. 
In such a context, competitive relations emerge and unilateral strategies 
often hinder cooperation. In general, the smaller second-tier units are, 
the more difficult it is to consistently separate their responsibilities and 
powers from those of municipalities and to avoid interdependence and 
competition in a number of areas. 
For several decades, intergovernmental relations in European context 
have been predominantly presented and analysed through the concept 
of multi-level governance (MLG) – a concept which denotes interactive, 
collaborative and network-like relations among different territorial levels 
in both policy formulation and policy implementation. Multi-level gov-
ernance captures the transformation of traditional top-down and formal 
relations into flexible, adaptive, and inclusive interaction. On a normative 
side, this transformation should contribute to the better quality of policies 
and to their greater legitimacy (Baldersheim, 2002; Đulabić, 2007; Pa-
nara, 2016; OECD, 2017; Koprić, 2018). The European Union (EU) has 
been both a proponent of such governance mechanisms and the object 
of analysis through the lenses of MLG. The EU’s advocacy of multi-level 
arrangements is mostly visible in territorial cohesion policies and accom-
panying funding. They provide guidelines and opportunities for intergov-
ernmental cooperation and simultaneously present palpable benefits of 
such efforts. Insisting on partnership among institutions during the devel-
opment and implementation of operational programmes and individual 
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projects, the EU decisively contributes to the decay of traditional hier-
archical management of territorial systems. Still, the overall EU impact 
on local government should not be overestimated, as it might be only 
“marginal in comparison to that of intermediate tiers and national govern-
ments” (Goldsmith & Page, 2010, p. 11). Although primarily understood 
as a concept that guides and explains policy design and implementation 
between all levels and their networks within the complex EU system con-
figuration, MLG is certainly an applicable and relevant framework for 
the relations between tiers within local government systems, especially as 
they have been increasingly influenced by policies and practices of higher 
levels of government, and vice-versa – as they are trying to influence the 
upper levels in bottom-up manner. The application of MLG framework 
to municipal-county relations suggests that they cannot be isolated from 
other actors and institutions belonging to the same multi-level structure 
as well as that their dynamics are, at least partially, the result of their own 
autonomous negotiations and adjustments. Along with questioning the 
principle of clear separation of responsibilities among local government 
tiers, multi-level reasoning has also challenged the principle of subsidiar-
ity which is deeply rooted in European tradition. Subsidiarity, as a norma-
tive principle, indicates the primacy of the municipal level of government 
and perceives higher sub-national tiers to be of secondary importance. 
This primacy is confirmed by historical and comparative experience – not 
all countries have (had) multiple local government levels, while municipal 
tier is omnipresent. Although the trend towards shared responsibilities 
between territorial levels has increased in the past several decades and 
“truly exclusive competences rarely exist” (OECD, 2019, p. 55), which 
stimulates various MLG arrangements, the question of clear indication 
of roles and competences and their decentralization to “the most local 
level” should not become irrelevant or obsolete. Reduction of complexity 
through mitigation of unnecessary negotiation, interaction and coopera-
tion is still possible and should be favoured in a number of policy areas. 
Moreover, sometimes it is the only way in which to attain a satisfactory 
level of political responsiveness and responsibility, and managerial effec-
tiveness.
In European countries, upper tier of local government is often only an 
auxiliary one – either supplementing the first tier of local governments in 
provision of more expensive and more complex services and/or acting as 
an agent of the State – transposing national policies to the local level by 
performing coordination, monitoring and supervision tasks over municipal 
authorities. In many cases, these counties/provinces/districts were created 
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as deconcentrated entities of national administration and were granted 
self-governmental status only later. In an era of comprehensive territorial 
reforms, second tier of local government has been proclaimed to be “the 
weakest link in the chain of multi-level government systems in European 
countries” (Bertrana & Heinelt, 2013, p. 86). It has been “crowded-out” 
by either consolidation of basic local government tier or the emergence 
and growing importance of wider regions, as it happened in Denmark 
(CLRA, 2013; OECD, 2017). These trends have been strongly influenced 
by the EU cohesion policies that were traditionally focused on region-
al level and, more recently, on municipal level through Urban Agenda 
policies (Heinelt, 2017). Larger cities, capitals, and specific metropolitan 
authorities are increasingly often excluded from the jurisdiction of sec-
ond-tier governments. Even when the abolishment of intermediate tier 
is not considered, these authorities are faced with threats of diminishing 
their importance through the transfer of their competences and resources 
to the upper or lower levels (France, Belgium, Romania), or through the 
abolishment of direct election of their representative bodies as is the case 
in Italy (CLRA, 2013).
The second tier of local government systems in general and its relations 
with municipal level in particular have been understudied and rather 
neglected in local government research (Egner, 2019). Following their 
comprehensive comparative research, which filled this gap, Bertrana and 
Heinelt developed a typology of second-tier government units with regard 
to their vertical power relations with higher and lower territorial levels. 
They distinguished: a) pure territorial units of local self-government with 
strong fiscal and politico-administrative capacities; b) second-tier govern-
ments with dual role as both self-government units and territorial state 
administration; c) “municipalized second tier” with moderate to weak ca-
pacity towards both upper levels of government and municipalities but 
with high level of discretion due to weak supervision and control (2013, 
pp. 80-81).
3. Local Government System in Croatia: Basic 
Features and Conceptual Developments
Croatia is the smallest member state of the European Union with two 
tiers of local government. There are 428 rural (općine) and 128 urban 
municipalities (towns – gradovi) at the first, and 20 counties (županije) at 
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the second level of the local government system. On average, there are 28 
municipalities per county, but this varies from 10 in Požeško-slavonska 
County to 55 in Splitsko-dalmatinska County. As the capital, the City of 
Zagreb has dual status of a municipality and a county, performing com-
petences of both, as well as a bulk of state administrative tasks. Both tiers 
have constitutional foundation and protection, and general legislation on 
local government (Local and Regional Self-government Act of 2011 with 
amendments) applies to them equally. Croatian municipalities are rather 
small – the mean population size is 7,700 (6,300 if Zagreb is excluded), but 
their average size does not tell the whole story as 71% of them have fewer 
than 5,000 inhabitants and almost half of them (49%) fewer than 3,000. 
With an average population of 175,000 Croatian counties are at the bottom 
of NUTS 3 statistical category (150,000 – 800,000) and, unsurprisingly, 
they are the smallest second-tier local authorities in Europe.
The current system of local government was established in 1993 replacing 
the one-tier system inherited from the socialist period that was based on 
100 large municipalities. Counties (županije) were established on a revival 
wave of historical identity and symbolism of Croatian statehood, as they 
had been organizations of local and regional public authority (in different 
shapes and roles) from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. Between 1993 and 2001, counties served as a backbone of the whole 
territorial system and had a dual role – simultaneously performing state ad-
ministrative tasks and self-government functions. The latter were quite lim-
ited and restrictively regulated. The narrow scope of local affairs combined 
with excessive supervision over local government policies secured hierarchi-
cal, top-down central-local relations. The primary purpose of counties was 
integrative one. They were expected to transmit central policies and regu-
lations into local arena and to monitor their implementation; to aggregate 
and harmonize interests, decisions and activities of municipalities in their 
area; to secure a balanced development of municipalities and to coordinate 
the network of educational, cultural, social and other institutions in their 
territory (Koprić, 1997). Superior-subordinate relations between munici-
palities and counties thus mirrored hierarchical governance of the whole 
state. Such relations negatively affected local autonomy.
Croatia partially ratified the ECLSG in 1997 and fully in 2008. Even 
before its full ratification, the constitutional amendments of 2000/2001 
embraced a modern European concept of local self-government based 
on subsidiarity, general nature of local competences and provided guar-
antees for a wide scope of local government affairs. The idea was to sep-
arate competences between the municipal and county levels clearly and 
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to terminate superior-subordinate relationships between the tiers. This 
was consistently implemented in general legislation, where there are no 
coordinating, monitoring or supervising competences provided for the 
counties over municipalities.2 Counties remained regional self-govern-
ment units only and lost their role of deconcentrated units of state ad-
ministration. The latter role was taken over by the newly established state 
administrative offices (one per county, each with several branch offices) 
as first instance of state administration, accountable to and supervised by 
central government. Counties’ primary role shifted from integration of 
the whole local government system to the provision of more complex and 
expensive public services that required a wider territorial scale. Moreo-
ver, they have gradually acquired the role of aggregators and harmonizers 
of micro-regional (economic) interests, especially since the institution-
al framework for regional development was not in place. Constitutional 
changes of 2000 were followed by decentralization measures in the fields 
of education, social care, healthcare, and fire service. New competences 
were granted to all counties and to a small number of towns. Decentrali-
zation reform was evaluated as limited, confusing, and hesitating since it 
covered only a small share of local governments and did not widen local 
autonomy at all (Koprić & Đulabić, 2018). Another decentralizing step 
happened in 2005 when a distinctive category of urban municipalities was 
established (large towns)3 and entrusted with new competences. These in-
cluded maintenance of public roads, issuing building permits, and imple-
mentation of zoning plans. Nevertheless, even during the decentralization 
phase Croatia remained a rather centralized country in which the share 
of local expenditures in general government expenditures rarely exceeded 
15%, and their share in GDP stagnated at 6-7%. A European-wide study 
(Ladner et al., 2019) ranks Croatia 24th among 39 countries according to 
the composite local autonomy index. Belonging to the group of countries 
with medium degree of local autonomy also reflects an unfinished process 
of decentralization and local government institutional development.
2 There is a single exception to that rule. Counties supervise and review individual ad-
ministrative decisions issued by municipal administration to which citizens have appealed. 
However, large towns are exempted from counties’ scrutiny as their decisions are reviewed 
directly by the central state administration.
3 A large town is a municipality with more than 35,000 inhabitants and there are 
16 such municipalities in Croatia. Additionally, same competences were simultaneously 
granted to eight more towns that are county seats, without meeting the aforementioned 
population threshold.
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Another systemic change was prepared during 2019 and entered into 
force at the beginning of 2020 with the new State Administration System 
Act. Contrary to the existing strategic documents that proclaimed their 
strengthening, state administrative offices were completely abolished. A 
major part of their competences was delegated to the counties, which 
also took over their employees. Although announced as a reform aiming 
at rationalization of public administration organization and decentraliza-
tion, a recent ex-ante evaluation study finds these objectives unattainable 
by this reform (Lopižić & Manojlović Toman, 2019). In reality, counties 
re-acquired the role and competences from 1993-2001 and consolidated 
their position in the Croatian territorial governance system, although this 
time without explicit superiority over municipalities.
4. Municipal-County Relations in Croatia
4.1. Allocation of Competences
According to relevant constitutional and almost identical provisions of 
the Local and Regional Self-government Act “municipalities are guaran-
teed affairs of local character which directly provide for citizens’ needs, 
in particular those related to: regulation of settlements and housing, spa-
tial and urban planning, utility services, childcare, social welfare, primary 
healthcare, elementary education, culture, physical education and sports, 
consumer protection, environment protection, fire protection, civil pro-
tection and traffic. Counties are guaranteed affairs of regional character, 
in particular those that are related to: education, health services, spatial 
and urban planning, economic development, traffic regulation and traffic 
infrastructure, planning and development of a network of educational, 
social, cultural and health institutions, issuing location and construc-
tion permits and other implementing documents on the territory outside 
large towns, and maintenance of public roads outside large towns” (Arts. 
19-20). Responsibilities of both levels are based on general competence 
clause. The law has provided for the possibility of transfer of functions and 
competences between the levels (upwards and downwards) and thus cre-
ated flexibility in the local government system. Municipalities may acquire 
competences of the county but can also transfer their competences in the 
opposite direction. Unfortunately, the wording of the provision indicates 
legislator’s reluctance to really allow such autonomous delegation and ac-
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quisition of competences.4 There are no official data on the frequency 
and character of such functional transfers, but it seems that they happen 
rarely. Several cases that can be traced online deal with the transfer of 
competences pertaining to management of elementary schools and with 
concessions of maritime domain from counties downwards. The most re-
cent report of Congress of Local and Regional Authorities on local and 
regional democracy in Croatia has found the allocation of competences 
to local government to be the most problematic issue standing in the way 
of full conformity of local government’s legislative framework to the pro-
visions of the ECLSG. This legal framework was assessed as only partially 
compliant to the principles of subsidiarity and general competence and as 
non-compliant to the principles of full and exclusive competences of local 
authorities (CLRA, 2016, pp. 17-20).
The following sub-sections provide an analysis of legal texts that regulate 
local government functions and competences. They are systemised ac-
cording to the different nature of relations that arise between the tiers due 
to their roles in various sectors of affairs (Škarica, 2018). The cases of full 
and clear separation of functions such as utility services (municipalities) 
or secondary education (counties) are excluded from the analysis.
4.1.1. Overlapping competences between the tiers. There are several policy 
areas in which identical competences are entrusted to both levels of local 
government. In the sector of fire protection, a domain which has been 
constitutionally decentralized to municipalities exclusively, both levels 
may adopt and implement programmes and projects for fire prevention 
as well as organize educational programmes related to fire prevention and 
firefighting for citizens. Even more cases of overlapping can be found in 
another public safety service – civil protection. This sector was decentral-
ized as late as in 2015, years after the Constitution proclaimed this service 
to be a domain of local (municipal) significance. Contrary to constitu-
tional provisions, it has been decentralized as a service where municipal-
ities and counties share their functions and competences. Both levels are 
4 The transfer of competences upwards requires only a decision of municipal council, 
the consent of the county is not needed. The opposite delegation (from counties to munici-
palities) is constrained by four conditions that have to be fulfilled cumulatively: a request 
of the municipality, the approval of county assembly and of central ministry responsible for 
particular functional area, as well as the assurance of adequate resources for exercising the 
transferred competence. This final condition is the most discouraging, since no criteria are 
provided for the assessment of “adequate resources” and it is not stipulated who would be in 
charge of making such an assessment.
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expected to secure planning, development, effectiveness and financing 
of the civil protection system by providing risk assessments, establishing 
civil protection units, adopting the plan of civil protection etc. In the sec-
tor of traffic regulation, the exact same competences are given to both 
municipalities and counties (more in: Škarica, 2018). In the sphere of 
preservation of cultural heritage, both levels are entitled to protect a cul-
tural property and to provide resources for its preservation. Childcare has 
been constitutionally entrusted to municipalities exclusively. Still, respec-
tive legal framework grants many responsibilities to both levels equally, 
stipulating that “counties, municipalities and the City of Zagreb have the 
right and duty to provide programmes for childcare and pre-school as well 
as the right to establish and manage kindergartens”.5
4.1.2. Counties as a substitution for municipalities. There are several func-
tional areas that have been constitutionally entrusted to municipalities, 
but sectoral legislation conferred these competences to counties only and, 
in some cases, to large towns. These are the sectors of primary health-
care, elementary education, social care and protection and environment 
protection. The 2001 package of decentralization policies (social welfare, 
healthcare and education) was ambiguous; although it overturned the 
overwhelming centralization in the public sphere, it restricted the reach 
of decentralization both functionally and territorially – only operational 
competences and financial obligations were transferred and solely to the 
counties (later accompanied by a number of urban municipalities). Al-
though legal framework for elementary and secondary education confers 
identical competences to both counties and municipalities, which would 
qualify as a case of overlapping, in practice only 34 municipalities have re-
ally taken over the establishment, management, and financing of elemen-
tary schools and dormitories. Healthcare legislation has completely omit-
ted the municipal tier from the healthcare system and respective policies. 
Only counties are entitled to perform activities, develop programmes, and 
establish institutions in the domain of primary and secondary healthcare. 
The system of social welfare is organized in a hierarchical manner and 
both counties and municipalities are marginalized. Municipalities are en-
trusted with limited competences of financing certain social compensa-
tions. Counties and large towns may perform a wider array of tasks – they 
5 Legal texts consulted and cited in this section are Fire Protection Act, Civil Protec-
tion System Act, Road Traffic Safety Act, Act on Protection and Preservation of Cultural 
Heritage, Childcare and Pre-school Education Act.
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can establish institutions for social care and provide other financial com-
pensations to population. The legislation on environment protection does 
not even recognize municipalities as relevant stakeholders in this policy 
domain. Counties do have substantial competences as they are entitled to 
decide on regimes for natural heritage protection, to proclaim such areas 
and to manage them, to establish public institutions and develop strategic 
programmes.6
4.1.3. Interfering competences between the tiers. In an array of policy areas 
where regulatory and strategic competences are shared between munici-
palities and counties, two types of situations arise. In the first one, compe-
tences are sequenced between the tiers and are complementary, without 
the establishment of superiority/subordination relationships. These are 
mostly the cases when counties perform coordinating and harmonizing 
role; a task that can be performed coercively. The second case is when 
competences between municipalities and counties overlap in a way that 
constrains the autonomy of municipalities. Then, decisions and regula-
tions of municipalities are subjected to county supervision or counties 
impose certain obligations on municipalities. Although communal waste 
management falls almost completely into municipal scope, counties do 
act as a supervisory instance. Municipal waste management annual plan, 
prior to its adoption, must be approved by the county department respon-
sible for environment protection. Moreover, municipalities have an annu-
al obligation to report about the state of implementation of the adopted 
plans to the respective county. Counties are entitled to develop strategies 
for tourism development and are legally expected to harmonize and con-
solidate municipal projects for tourism development. Besides being a case 
of overlapping competences, childcare is also an example of coordinating 
role counties perform for their municipalities. Based on municipal plans, 
counties coordinate and harmonize the development of kindergarten net-
work. This coordinating role also includes the development of financing 
criteria for childcare that each municipality must adhere to. In the field of 
fire protection, counties coordinate firefighting and fire prevention activ-
ities. Counties organizationally integrate different municipal firefighting 
squads and units into the county firefighting association. Counties are 
expected to coordinate and harmonize municipal fire protection plans 
when developing their own plan. New firefighting legislation (in force 
6 Legal texts consulted and cited in this section are Education Act, Healthcare Act, 
Social Welfare and Protection Act, Environment Protection Act, Nature Preservation Act.
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from the beginning of 2020) has re-introduced a strict hierarchy in the 
system. Without prior approval of the county firefighting commander, 
municipalities cannot adopt their fire protection plans or establish fire-
fighting association. They also need his/her consent for the appointment 
of commanders of municipal fire brigades and fire associations. Munici-
pal-county relations in spatial planning and zoning are arguably the most 
hierarchical ones. Municipal spatial plans must comply with county plans 
and cannot be adopted without prior approval of the responsible county 
department. Furthermore, county departments for spatial planning are 
the only institutions empowered to draw-up such plans, even for munic-
ipalities. Finally, counties are in charge of the implementation of zoning 
plans through issuing different kinds of permits, with the exception of 
large towns.7
4.1.4. Functional classification of local government expenditure. Cases of 
overlapping and interfering competences in different sectors, as well those 
in which counties substitute municipal government, indicate blurry rela-
tions and almost chaotic lines of responsibility. This section aims to clear 
the picture by indicating local government expenditures in several impor-
tant sectors, according to functional classification of expenses (Table 1). 
Although the share of expenses does not fully correlate to the overall im-
portance of the territorial level in a policy area, it does provide a more pre-
cise insight in the distribution of responsibilities between them. The City 
of Zagreb is excluded from the analysis because, due to the specificities of 
its status, it does not predominantly belong to either of the tiers. As the 
preceding analysis suggests, counties are dominant actors in healthcare 
and prevalent in elementary education, while municipalities have main-
tained or increased their dominant role in social care and fire protection. 
Despite legal provisions that would suggest otherwise, municipalities are 
more important actors in environment protection policy, although not as 
dominant as before.
7 Legal texts consulted and cited in this section are Sustainable Waste Management 
Act, Act on associations and promotion in Tourism, Firefighting Act, Spatial Planning Act. 
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Municipalities 9 / 11 42 / 42 55 / 66 95 / 95 90.5 / 74.5
Counties 91 / 89 58 / 58 45 / 34 5 / 5 9.5 / 25.5
Source: Author, based on the data provided by the Ministry of Finance
Overall, a significant share of counties’ activities is dedicated to the provi-
sion of services which are constitutionally recognized as municipal scope 
of public affairs. A more detailed look into the structure of county ex-
penditures in 2015 shows that total expenditure in domains that are con-
stitutionally entrusted to municipalities exclusively (childcare, social pro-
tection, elementary education, environment protection, fire protection, 
civil protection, and sport) amounted to 1.1 billion kuna, which makes 
28.7% of their total annual expenditures.10
4.2. Financial Interdependence between the Tiers
Croatian local government system is characterized by low levels of finan-
cial decentralization and fiscal autonomy. Both tiers are heavily depend-
ent on national fiscal policies. The most important source of revenue for 
both tiers is the personal income tax, which is allocated in full to munici-
8 We used the year 2015 and not the most recent year with available data (2018) in 
this comparison because of the change in expenditure classification found in local govern-
ment reports submitted to the Ministry of Finance. Starting from 2016, functional classifica-
tion of expenditure does not contain all expenditures in a particular sector, excluding those 
for financial assets. Data in this section, as well as in section 4.2, are drawn and calculated 
from aggregate budgetary reports that are annually submitted to the Ministry of Finance by 
all local government units: http://www.mfin.hr/hr/financijski-izvjestaji-jlprs 
9 Without expenditures for waste management and sewage services which are exclu-
sive municipal responsibility.
10 This calculation does not even include expenditures in primary healthcare, which 
is also a municipal function “usurped” by the counties because these expenditures cannot be 
distinguished from others in that sector.
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palities and counties.11 The share counties have in total local government 
expenditure is quite small (around 21%) and does not really correspond 
to a rather strong position they occupy in a multitude of policy areas ana-
lysed in the previous chapter. Still, their expenditures have been growing 
at a faster rate (114% increase) during the observed period than those 
of municipalities combined (108% increase), although the difference this 
small does not indicate an unambiguous and irreversible trend (Table 2).
Table 2. Local government expenditure 2002-2018 (HRK millions)
2002










Counties 1,975 20.8 4,240 21.3 114
Rural 
municipalities
1,595 16.8 4,928 24.7 209
Urban 
municipalities
5,919 62.4 10,751 54 81
Total 
municipalities
7,514 79.2 15,679 78.7 108
Total 9,489 100 19,919 100 110
Source: Author, based on the data provided by the Ministry of Finance
A substantial share of local government revenue comes from transfers 
and grants from the central government. These grants were much more 
substantial to the counties and comprised more than 37% of their to-
tal revenues in 2018. Counties benefit the most from earmarked grants 
for delegated functions in health, social protection, and elementary ed-
ucation sectors. Urban municipalities are the most self-sustainable local 
government units and are the main casualties of the existing financial 
equalization scheme (Table 3).
11 60% of the revenue belongs to the municipal tier, 17% to the counties, another 
17% to fiscal equalization fund and remaining 6% is distributed to those units that took over 
financing of decentralized functions in education, health and social care.
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Counties 326.3 113.7 1,147.3 1,587.3 37.4 55.6
Rural 
municipalities
146.2 290.9 23.3 460.4 9.3 16.1
Urban 
municipalities
144.2 299.3 362.6 806.1 7.5 28.3
Total 
municipalities
290.4 590.2 385.9 1,266.5 8.1 44.4
Total 616.7 703.9 1,533.2 2,853.8 14.3 100
Source: Author, based on the data provided by the Ministry of Finance
Another significant source of local government budget revenue is EU 
structural and investment funds and their share has had an increasing tra-
jectory. In 2018, transfers (direct and indirect) from EU funds amounted 
to HRK 799 million – 4% of total local government expenditure. In total 
terms, municipalities are more successful in obtaining EU funding, de-
spite the fact that these transfers are much more important for counties 
and have a much larger share in their budgets (Table 4).
Table 4. EU funding acquired by municipalities and counties in 2018 (HRK 
millions)
EU transfers
% of tier 
expenditure
% of total EU 
transfers
Counties 279.6 6.6 35
Rural municipalities 205.3 4.1 25.7
Urban municipalities 314.1 2.9 39.3
Total municipalities 519.4 3.3 65
Total 799 4 100
Source: Author, based on the data provided by the Ministry of Finance
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Along with transfers from the national and supra-national institutions, 
both local government tiers also benefit from each other – mutual trans-
fers are a well-established practice. Financial assistance in both directions 
is not legally required and it is not so significant when compared to trans-
fers from the central level. All transfers from counties to municipalities 
add up to 4.5% of county expenditures (188.8 HRK million), while those 
in opposite direction make up only 0.1% of municipal budgets (20 HRK 
million). They usually pertain to agreements and contracts on co-financ-
ing of certain investments of local significance – pre-school buildings, 
roads, utility infrastructure, and co-financing of domestic components of 
EU-funded projects. Net transfers are shown in Table 5 and show a rela-
tively small financial dependence of municipalities on counties, but also 
a clear difference between urban and rural municipalities in this regard. 
Besides direct transfers, counties regularly provide guarantees for com-
mercial loans that municipalities take.
Table 5. Net value (surplus) for municipalities in municipal-county mutual 







% of tier 
expenditure
% in total 
surplus
Rural municipalities 34.8 69.8 104.6 2.1 62
Urban municipalities 22.1 42.2 64.3 0.6 38
Total municipalities 56.9 112 168.9 1.1 100
Source: Author, based on the data provided by the Ministry of Finance
4.3. Local and Regional Development and Cooperation
A modern, EU-inspired approach to the issues of local and regional de-
velopment was introduced rather late, at the beginning of 2010 when the 
Regional Development Act was adopted. It was renewed in 2015 to adjust 
the system of regional policy planning to the next cycle of EU budgeting 
(2014-2020). The principles of partnership and cooperation among actors 
in this policy area are fundamental for success of regional policies and 
individual projects. Municipalities and counties are explicitly instructed 
to work together during the whole cycle of regional policy as well as to 
cooperate with external stakeholders. Partnership councils, as the main 
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monitoring bodies and cooperative platforms, are established at the level 
of statistical regions and at the county level. Representatives of munici-
palities participate in these councils at both levels. Nevertheless, counties 
retained the dominant position, at least in their own councils, as county 
governor nominates council members and regional coordinator steers and 
administers council activities and decisions. Municipal representatives 
make up about one quarter of all council members at the county level 
and urban municipalities are much better represented. Regional develop-
ment agencies as coordinators of regional development activities (one in 
each county) have the responsibility to guide and assist municipalities in 
their area with preparation and implementation of development projects. 
Although legal provisions allow for cooperation between municipalities 
and counties in establishing these institutions (as their joint founders), 
they have been established jointly only in four cases. As a rule, local-level 
partners are exclusively urban municipalities (towns). Lack of joint organ-
izations, institutions, or administrative bodies established cooperatively 
by counties and municipalities is not only a characteristic of regional pol-
icy domain. Such cooperative entities are virtually non-existent in other 
sectors as well, as there are no jointly founded kindergartens, schools, so-
cial-care institutions, or other service delivery organizations. Several cases 
of cooperation have emerged in the field of waste management. Five out 
of 13 regional waste management centres were co-founded by counties 
and several municipalities jointly.12 Certain level of coordination between 
counties and municipalities is achieved through periodic and sporadic 
meetings of local executive officials, usually called by the county governor 
once or twice a year. This practice is far from uniform across counties. In 
the areas of fire protection and tourism planning, cooperation between 
municipalities and counties is legally stipulated: there is a county asso-
ciation as an umbrella body for municipal firefighting squads and asso-
ciations and a county tourist association as an umbrella body for munic-
ipal tourist associations. In the areas of public health and public safety 
mutual efforts have been spontaneously institutionalized through formal 
associations. Croatian network of healthy cities was established in 1992, 
bringing together 17 cities and 14 counties for the time being.13 In 2013, 
12 As a rule, co-founders are larger urban municipalities: Karlovac, Rijeka, Pula, Za-




























the Platform of Croatian counties and cities for minimization of risks of 
catastrophic events was established. There are 15 counties and 13 cities in 
this association.14 Municipalities and counties, however, cooperate quite 
regularly on operative level because they often collectively design, apply 
and implement EU-funded projects as co-beneficiaries and/or partners. 
New horizontal legislation on strategic planning in the whole public 
sphere was adopted in 2017 (The Act on the System of Strategic Plan-
ning and Managing Development), introducing a hierarchical system of 
strategic planning. It has embraced and solidified the coordinating and 
monitoring roles that counties have over municipalities and additionally 
constrained the autonomy of municipalities. They are entitled to adopt 
their own strategic plans for development only exceptionally – when their 
natural or socio-economic characteristics require such a specific approach 
that their development cannot be based on more general county-level 
plans. The content of municipal plans is also limited – local plans are 
intended to implement documents for achieving the objectives stipulated 
in the plans of higher territorial levels. Parallel with (and even before) 
this legislative revitalization of coordinating and harmonizing tasks that 
counties perform with regard to development and strategic issues, they 
unilaterally assumed similar roles. An analysis of counties’ basic bylaws 
(statutes) is quite telling about their self-perception: 14 of them have 
rather elaborated provisions on municipal-county relations, which typi-
cally include following self-imposed responsibilities: regular consultations 
with municipalities, aggregation and harmonization of municipal interests 
and their representation, assurance of harmonized development of mu-
nicipalities, professional assistance to representative and administrative 
municipal bodies, coordination of municipal activities in their collective 
interest, etc.15
4.4. Municipal-County Relations through the Eyes  
of Local Actors
A limited number of studies and surveys have focused on local actors’ 
perceptions and assessments of municipal-county relations. They are pre-
14 https://platforma-hzg.hr/o-nama/
15 Although all of these bylaws were adopted during this decade, their wordings of the 
cited provisions are very similar to the provisions regulating counties’ scope of competences 
in pre-2000 legislation.
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sented in the following paragraphs and provide a valuable echo of formal 
roles and relations outlined throughout the paper. In a comprehensive 
comparative research, conducted on councillors in second-tier local gov-
ernments in 14 European countries, Croatian counties ranked at the very 
top among second-tier local authorities according to the criteria of in-
fluence and autonomy towards municipal level. At the same time, the 
autonomy of counties in relation to the national level was assessed as low 
– Croatian counties ranked 9th on the list (Lindstrom and Roos, 2016).
In a survey conducted by Đulabić in 2018, municipalities (mayors) were 
asked to assess the existing distribution of powers and competences be-
tween municipalities and counties in various sectors. The survey covered 
all municipalities and approximately 30% of them responded (N=170). 
The results (Table 6) have shown that in neither of the sectors the alloca-
tion of competences is assessed as satisfactory.


















































Good and very good 11% 27% 22% 32% 51% 28%
Neither good nor bad 24% 35% 32% 36% 24% 27%
Bad and very bad 24% 21% 33% 25% 17% 37%
Not enough experience 41% 18% 22% 6% 7% 8%
Source: Author, based on Đulabić (2018) 
An additional insight into municipal-county relations was provided by the 
research conducted in 2016 which covered all Croatian municipalities with 
more than 5,000 inhabitants (161) with a response rate of 42% (N=67).16 
16 Research was conducted by Ivan Koprić, Jasmina Džinić (Faculty of Law, Univer-
sity of Zagreb) and the author of this paper as a part of European-wide research whose main 
findings were published in the book Political Leaders in Changing Local Democracy – The Eu-
ropean Mayor (2018), edited by H. Heinelt, A. Magnier, M. Cabria and H. Reynaert. Some 
results of the research regarding Croatian case were published in Džinić & Škarica, 2017 
and Koprić & Škarica, 2017.
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In Tables 7 to 9 the responses are presented separately for smaller (5,000-
10,000) and for larger units (>10,000)17 in order to examine the variation 
between the two categories regarding their perception of municipal-coun-
ty relations and their attitude towards the counties. Mayors were asked 
to declare the most important challenges their municipalities face and 
the extent to which addressing and solving these problems is dependent 
on cooperation and support from different institutions. Their assessment 
of the dependence on counties is presented in Table 8. The results show 
a significant level of dependence – support of their respective county is 
very important to all municipalities regardless of their size. Comparative-
ly, Croatia scores very high on intergovernmental dependence of munic-
ipalities. In summary results of the same survey for 21 countries Croatia 
ranked sixth (Denters, Steyvers, Klok & Cermak, 2018, p. 285).











0 1 5 15 13 4.17
Municipalities 
5-10,000 (N=31)
0 3 1 13 14 4.22
Total (N=65) 0 4 6 28 27 4.20
Source: Author
Mayors were asked to assess the desirability of certain reforms. Decen-
tralization to the counties is regarded as desirable although mayors of 
larger municipalities are more reserved towards such a policy (Table 8). 
In a similar fashion, larger municipalities are more open to a reform that 
would reduce the number of counties, while this structural reform is not 
so desirable among mayors of smaller municipalities (Table 9).
17 There are 74 municipalities with a population over 10,000 and 33 of them (44.5%) 
responded the questionnaire. Out of 87 municipalities in the category of 5-10,000 inhabit-
ants, 34 of them (39%) responded.
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2 3 10 9 5 3.41
Municipalities 
5-10,000 (N=28)
0 3 5 12 8 3.89
Total (N=57) 2 6 15 21 13 3.65
Source: Author









2 6 6 7 8 3.45
Municipalities 
5-10,000 (N=27)
3 11 8 2 3 2.67
Total (N=56) 5 17 14 9 11 3.07
Source: Author
5. Analysis of the Findings and Discussion
During period covered in the paper Croatian local government went 
through important conceptual changes and functional reshufflings, but 
its basic structure remained intact. Moreover, even the distribution of 
revenues and expenditures among the tiers did not change considerably. 
Overall, counties have solidified their position as inevitable intersections 
of national sectoral policies and continue to be of vital importance for 
their transmission to the local level and for channelling accompanying 
resources to local public institutions. For such a role, they are abundantly 
subsidized by national transfers which constitute a substantial share of 
their revenues. A combination of several factors helped to shape current 
position of the counties: their physical proximity to municipal issues due 
to their small size; great disparities among municipalities that provoked 
the need for an auxiliary tier, and their deeply rooted symbolic and po-
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litical importance. These factors have modelled a unique type of munic-
ipal-county relations in Croatia that is not easily classified into existing 
typologies.
A functional analysis has shown that during the observed period counties 
and municipalities became more functionally intertwined than ever. This 
has created more lines of interdependence, and, naturally, more opportu-
nities for both cooperation and conflict. Many sectoral policies analysed 
in Chapter 4 have deviated from the clear-cut relations established in the 
Constitution and general legislation, but not in a uniform way. In cer-
tain cases, tiers are in a hierarchical relationship (environment protection, 
firefighting, spatial and urban planning), while in others their roles are 
more complementary. Diverse sectoral configurations of municipal-coun-
ty functional relations indicate an absence of effective policy coordina-
tion between line ministries. As a uniform and strategic decentralization 
programme has never been adopted by national institutions, this lack of 
coherent approach comes as no surprise. Analysed cases of overlapping 
and interfering competences clearly demonstrate that vertically shared 
policy domains and associated competences have become the rule, not 
the exception. Mayors’ assessment of competence distribution (Đulabić, 
2018) between the tiers confirmed that it has rarely been fully appropri-
ate, at least from the municipal point of view. Several constitutionally 
guaranteed municipal competences have been “usurped” by the counties 
– a situation that is tolerated by all the actors involved as it has not been 
properly challenged in the Constitutional Court yet. 
Another aspect of this growing complexity has been the steady functional 
differentiation of municipalities which is the result of asymmetric decen-
tralization policies in health and social care, firefighting, education, road 
maintenance, and implementation of spatial and construction regulations. 
Such policies have drawn a dividing line between larger urban municipali-
ties and smaller, mostly rural ones. For the first time in recent history such 
a formal distinction was established. While smaller municipalities have re-
mained functionally substituted and therefore dependent on the counties, 
large towns have acquired additional competences which allowed them 
to further separate from county influence. However, the emancipation 
of urban municipalities from the counties is limited and only partial; de-
spite gaining a number of competences, they are still subjected to county 
regulations, strategic plans and policies, as they are not formally excluded 
from their jurisdiction. Further emancipation of towns from the influence 
of counties, both in number of municipalities and more substantial level 
of autonomy is inevitable and will likely be the main source of future fric-
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tions and conflict in the territorial governance system. However, a signifi-
cantly larger group of municipalities has been deprived of important func-
tions and substantial autonomy. On top of being functionally substituted 
in a number of policy areas, smaller (rural) municipalities are also more 
financially dependent on counties as it is indicated by municipal-county 
transfers of funds. At the same time, this dependence is also reverse – the 
performance of constitutionally municipal competences is an important 
source of legitimacy for the counties and a major justification of their 
existence. County expenditure for such tasks comprises more than a third 
of their total budgets. Because of this interdependence, counties and 
smaller municipalities have developed a symbiotic relationship in which 
their specific interests are intermingled and mostly aligned. Although not 
comprehensively convincing, the research results presented in Section 4.4 
do indicate such relations – support for decentralization to counties and 
for the preservation of their current number is more emphasized among 
smaller units. “Municipalization” of counties may seem a reasonable strat-
egy from their point of view, but in the long term it harms the local gov-
ernment system as a whole, at least in two aspects: a) by dealing with local 
issues, counties cannot develop a wider perspective and a true regional 
orientation, which is necessary for solving problems on a wider scale; b) 
by being too close (in physical proximity and in competences) to basic 
local issues and problems, counties make municipalities quite numb and 
less capable of autonomous adaptation to modern circumstances as well 
as passive in attracting new resources and solutions.
The influence of EU policies on municipal-county relations has been 
ambiguous. They managed to introduce and support various cooperative 
practices between the tiers that transformed their traditional hierarchi-
cal and/or non-interactive relational patterns. On a more strategic level, 
however, the EU-inspired approach to local and regional development 
reaffirmed the coordinating and harmonizing role of the counties, ensur-
ing their dominance over municipalities in these domains. Nevertheless, 
a more intensive cooperation has not produced a significant number of 
permanent vertical cooperative institutions (service delivery organizations 
or policy coordination/planning forums) yet. Multi-level arrangements 
are mostly confined to ad-hoc assistance and project-based cooperation, 
which are usually only temporary and occasional. The narrow scope of 
competences, a low level of autonomy and significant resource depend-
ence on upper levels are discouraging both vertical and horizontal co-
operation. In such a competitive environment, collective responses and 
cooperative behaviour of actors involved are seriously jeopardized; no one 
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is too keen to share powers or to pool resources that are quite limited. 
Along this line of argumentation, it is understandable why consensual 
rearrangements (delegation and acquisition) of competences between 
the tiers, although legally possible, happen very rarely and even then, are 
susceptible to political arbitration. The legal frame for multi-level govern-
ance arrangements in Croatian local government has been set because 
interdependences between the tiers and blurry responsibilities have lately 
flourished. However, this situation has not produced adequate practice 
yet; hierarchical and formal relations between municipalities and counties 
are still dominant, fuelled and overshadowed by centralistic governance 
of the whole country. It is evident that at the moment, it is not possible 
to build relations within local government systems on strict separation 
of responsibilities and powers, as well as that increased interdependence 
does not guarantee harmonized and successful collective action, especial-
ly when it implies uncertainties and potential loss of autonomy. Therefore, 
a clear separation of competences is not an obstacle for a more intense 
collaboration of local governments, it actually seems to be one of its most 
vital prerequisites.
Croatian counties have not been “squeezed out” by either territorial con-
solidation of municipal tier or by integrated inter-municipal institutions. 
No such reform has been seriously considered let alone attempted, and 
it is completely absent from the Croatian mainstream political discourse. 
Inter-municipal cooperation is quite common, and it happens mostly 
through joint ownership of local service delivery organizations. However, 
more integrated forms of cooperation vested with public authority and 
policy coordination competences are non-existent. From the local point 
of reasoning, such cooperative arrangements (or even real territorial con-
solidation) would result in strong dominance of large municipalities over 
smaller ones and would constrain them in pursuing and protecting their 
own interests. Reminiscence of marginalization and neglect of peripheral 
areas (now individual municipalities) in large socialist municipalities is 
still strong and the level of mutual trust remains quite low. Thus far, the 
informal alliance between counties and smaller municipalities has suc-
cessfully resisted such reforms because any step towards the consolidation 
of municipal tier would expose the redundancy of counties in such config-
uration and show how easily they can be replaced – the outcomes already 
indicated by decentralization to large towns.
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The developments in the past two decades have not significantly altered 
deeply rooted nature of municipal-county relations where counties are 
there to coordinate, supervise, assist, and supplement the lower-level au-
thorities. During this period counties have not advanced much from their 
original purpose and have remained the epitome and guardians of tradi-
tional top-down territorial governance. Longitudinal perspective of mu-
nicipal-county relations in Croatia has thus shown a strong path-depend-
ent trajectory that hardly deviated at all even when significant contextual 
changes occurred – constitutional redefinition of the local government sys-
tem at the beginning of the century and EU membership being the most 
important ones. A situation like this opposes comparatively dominant 
trends that suggest marginalization of the tier situated between municipal 
and regional tier and the rise of municipal and regional levels of govern-
ment. The peculiarity of Croatian case demonstrates quite a limited influ-
ence of these trends on domestic institutional development. Moreover, it 
shows that despite the undeniable external harmonizing forces, national 
local government systems remain significantly, and sometimes decisively 
conditioned by internal factors and traditions. As the previous analysis 
has shown, inertia and resistance of politico-administrative institutions to 
more profound changes should never be underestimated. If the current 
organization of the local government system in Croatia persists, one could 
expect further escalation of competitive and conflictual relations along 
vertical axis of the territorial system which would harm tremendously its 
collective capacity for problem-solving and development. The analysed 
dependences and conflicts make the redefinition of municipal-county re-
lations in the existing local government framework an impossible task. 
Their improvement is, therefore, viable only if a comprehensive territorial 
reform takes place – a reform that would consolidate the municipal tier, 
harmonize the capacities of local governments, allow for even and clear-
cut allocation of tasks and powers and enable a true implementation of 
subsidiarity principle.
This paper has attempted to draw a general picture of the relations be-
tween the two tiers of local government in Croatia without analysing indi-
vidual situations. Therefore, future research should focus on factors that 
contribute to these variations and differ the relations despite their com-
mon institutional context. Structural, cultural, financial, and (inter)-per-
sonal factors pertaining to various municipalities, counties, politicians, 
and public managers should help us understand the emergence of inter-
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active and cooperative relationships and institutions in the midst of inter-
dependency and uncertainty. In this way, policies aiming to support these 
relations could be based on better evidence.
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INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE TIERS IN CROATIAN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT: WHO IS WINNING THE  
INTERDEPENDENCE GAME
Summary
The paper examines, analyses, and evaluates the relations between the first and 
second tiers of the Croatian local government system and their longitudinal and 
cross-sectoral dynamics. Membership in the European Union has opened new 
relevant horizons for national territorial governance, primarily through the ad-
vocacy of multi-level cooperative governance arrangements and by providing 
opportunities for the acquisition of additional resources through European 
structural and investment funds. These issues are evaluated by analysing for-
mal competence distribution between the tiers, by analysing the distribution of 
resources between tiers and through their cooperation in regional policy domain 
and service delivery. Furthermore, actors’ perceptions of their mutual relations 
are examined via the author’s own research and the research of other scholars. 
After the introductory chapter, the second chapter presents a theoretical fra-
mework and context for an analysis of vertical relations within the local go-
vernment system; the third chapter provides a longitudinal overview of the main 
features and conceptual developments of the Croatian local government system. 
The fourth chapter is the central part of the paper that presents and analyses 
the available primary and secondary data. Preliminary findings suggest seve-
ral conclusions: a) areas of contact between municipal and county levels have 
increased resulting in their more intensive interdependence; b) relations between 
the levels have been differentiating and cannot be considered uniform: different 
kinds of relations have developed between counties and small municipalities and 
between counties and large towns; c) centralistic governance of the whole system 
stimulates the development of competition between the tiers, which endangers 
their collective and cooperative efforts in resolving local issues and stimulating 
local development; d) counties have solidified their position of an inevitable in-
tersection of national sectoral policies and are of vital importance for their tran-
smission to the local level.
Keywords: cooperation, Europeanization, inter-governmental relations, local 
government in Croatia, multi-level governance, second tier of local government
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MEĐURAZINSKI ODNOSI U HRVATSKOJ LOKALNOJ 
SAMOUPRAVI: TKO POBJEĐUJE U IGRI MEĐUOVISNOSTI 
Sažetak
U radu se ispituje, analizira i evaluira razvoj odnosa između prve i druge ra-
zine jedinica u hrvatskom sustavu lokalne samouprave te njihova vremenska 
i sektorska dinamika. Članstvo u Europskoj uniji donijelo je novine lokalnoj 
samoupravi primarno kroz zalaganje za višerazinske suradničke upravljačke 
aranžmane i osiguravanje prilika za dobivanje dodatnih sredstava iz struktur-
nih i investicijskih fondova EU. Ta se pitanja vrednuju putem analize formalne 
raspodjele djelokruga i sredstava te suradnje u regionalnoj politici i pružanju 
usluga jedinica na različitim razinama teritorijalne organizacije. Analiziraju se 
i percepcije aktera o odnosima među jedinicama na različitim razinama koje su 
prikupljene tijekom autorskog istraživanja i u okviru istraživanja drugih znan-
stvenika. Rad započinje uvodom. U drugom poglavlju daje se teorijski okvir i 
kontekst analize vertikalnih odnosa u sustavu lokalne samouprave. U trećem 
se poglavlju sistematiziraju glavne crte i konceptualni razvoj hrvatskog sustava 
lokalne samouprave. Ključno, četvrto poglavlje analizira dostupne primarne i 
sekundarne podatke koji omogućavaju sljedeće preliminarne zaključke: a) pod-
ručja kontakta temeljne i županijske razine se šire što rezultira njihovom inten-
zivnijom međuovisnošću, b) odnosi među razinama se diferenciraju i ne mogu se 
smatrati jednoobraznima: razvijaju se različiti odnosi između županija i malih 
lokalnih jedinica te između županija i velikih gradova, c) centralističko uprav-
ljanje zemljom potiče razvoj kompeticije među razinama lokalne samouprave 
što ugrožava njihove kolektivne i kooperativne kapacitete za rješavanje lokalnih 
pitanja i poticanje lokalnog razvoja, d) županije učvršćuju svoju poziciju ne-
zaobilaznog sjecišta nacionalnih sektorskih politika od vitalnog značenja za 
njihovu transmisiju prema lokalnoj razini.
Ključne riječi: suradnja, europeizacija, odnosi među vlastima, lokalna samou-
prava – Hrvatska, višerazinsko upravljanje, druga razina lokalne samouprave
